The central question is whether calling a choice “bad” is itself an
unjustified assumption.
Many ethical views treat the ability to choose as a core part of human dignity.
On this view, even harmful or risky decisions can express something
valuable—personal agency. Intervening too quickly risks overriding that agency.
However, most moral frameworks still evaluate choices.
Consequentialist views judge actions by their expected outcomes. If giving
everything away is likely to lead to serious harm (to oneself or dependents),
that counts against it.
Deontological views may hold that certain duties (like basic self-preservation
or responsibilities to others) limit what one may choose.
Even if a decision leads to short-term fulfillment or happens not to result in
harm, it can still be criticized based on what was reasonably foreseeable at the
time. Moral judgment usually relies on expected risk, not just actual outcomes.
At the same time, uncertainty matters. Predictions about harm are not always
reliable, so interference with someone’s choices requires strong
justification—especially when the harm is only to the person themselves. A
common position is that intervention is more justified to prevent harm to others
than to prevent self-regarding risks.
Context also matters. If someone has very little time left to live, the weight
of long-term consequences decreases, and choices that would normally seem
imprudent may become more reasonable. This shows that moral evaluation is often
sensitive to circumstances, not NECESSARILY that it becomes meaningless.
But there are cases where it undoubtedly is.
Individuals often understand their own situation best, but they are not
perfectly reliable due to biases and blind spots. Input from others can
sometimes improve judgment, not by eliminating bias, but by offering different
perspectives that may reduce error. However, such input is not guaranteed to
help and should not automatically override personal judgment.
Overall, calling a choice “bad” is not necessarily a mere assumption. It can be
a reasoned evaluation based on evidence about risks, responsibilities, and
likely outcomes. But because these judgments are uncertain and
context-dependent, they should be made cautiously and do not always justify
interfering with another person’s autonomy.
We have found that accusing somebody of harm violates the rule that you
should not do so when you cannot prove that their choice was really that
foolish. We are less certain about what choices are bad than we pretend.