From the view that choice alone matters - that it is effectively a good work in itself:
Choice has moral value in itself; consenting is an action, not a passive state.
If moral praise depends on consent, then consent counts as a good work.
Saying “God does the good, I only consent” does not eliminate moral credit; it relocates it to choice.
If ought implies can, then consenting is the full extent of what is morally required and deserves full valuation.
Rewarding consent while denying its moral worth is inconsistent.
If all human actions depend 100% on God, then human independence is illusory, but moral responsibility still attaches to consent.
Claiming humility while treating consent as morally decisive is self-contradictory.
If choice is praised regardless of outcome, purpose becomes secondary and risks nihilism.
If choice is for a purpose, the decisive question is whose purpose governs the choice.
Making God’s purpose authoritative requires consent, which re-centers moral authority in the chooser.
Thus, religious morality cannot avoid grounding value in human choice.
Treating choice as supreme implicitly or effectively divinizes the will of the chooser.
This form of self-authority is compatible with atheism and unstable within theism.
Therefore, elevating choice inevitably produces self-righteousness, even when framed as humility.
Here are some additional points that fit the perspective:
Choice is inherently creative; the act of deciding generates reality in one’s own “universe” of responsibility.
Moral evaluation can attach to the act of choosing, not only the outcomes or alignment with divine will.
Even if all ability comes from God, the decision to act is an original exercise of human agency.
Choice validates personal identity; choosing is an expression of selfhood and autonomy.
Feeling like a “God of your own will” is psychologically natural if choice is viewed as central.
Dependence on external powers (e.g., God) does not erase the moral significance of choosing.
Lying to oneself about one’s moral role undermines authentic freedom; honesty about choice enhances moral reality.
Choice divorced from purpose can feel empty, but purposeless choice still demonstrates freedom and moral selfhood.
Consent to moral action is itself a measurable contribution, regardless of whether the act’s external effect is large or small.
Recognition of God or external authority can coexist with acknowledgment of one’s own moral agency.
Elevating choice challenges conventional religious notions of humility and obedience.
Moral responsibility arises not from outcome but from engagement in decision-making.
Choice implies both potential for greatness and potential for error; the act of choosing is always morally relevant.