1 WHAT IS WRONG WITH, "MY DESIRE BEING MINE DOES NOT MEAN IT IS IN ANY WAY ABOUT ME"
In brief, it ignores how an act can be its own reward.
It is thinking of a person doing good and seeking nothing back after doing it.
We need an argument.
Desire is often misunderstood as only being about future fulfillment. We assume desire aims at achieving something, acquiring something, or filling a lack. But desire isn't always future-oriented or goal-driven. Sometimes, the value is in the act itself, not in its outcome. The reward can be built into the doing. Acting on desire may be meaningful even if it leads to failure, disappointment, or harm. Doing has intrinsic value. The ability to act — to respond, to move, to create — has worth independent of the results. Even when abused, action expresses life. Misguided or destructive actions may still reveal a deep need to feel alive or real. Desire is a form of engagement with life. It expresses aliveness, agency, and presence — even if the desire is not fulfilled or understood.
There is mystery in why we desire at all. Desire often arises from unconscious or complex origins that resist clear explanation. Acting on desire affirms our existence. Regardless of success or failure, to act is to assert one’s being in the world. Existential and Nietzschean perspectives align with this view.
Nietzsche: even suffering and failure can be expressions of the will to power and life.
Sartre: we are always choosing — even in refusal — and that choosing defines us.
Conclusion: Doing > Fulfillment
Desire is not always about getting something in the future. No matter how much I don't want to do something, I want to do it under the circumstances. Sometimes, the point is simply that we can do, we can act, and that doing is already enough.
Desire isn’t always about future fulfillment or getting something. Sometimes, the value lies in the act itself—the doing is its own reward. Acting expresses life and agency, even if it leads to failure or harm. Self-harm or destructive actions can still have personal meaning, fulfilling a deep need. Philosophers like Nietzsche and Sartre support this view, showing that action affirms existence regardless of outcome. Thus, doing can be more important than fulfillment.
2 WHAT IS WRONG WITH, "MY DESIRE BEING MINE DOES NOT MEAN IT IS IN ANY WAY ABOUT ME"
Human desire has long been a subject of philosophical reflection, psychological inquiry, and existential concern. One commonly encountered claim is that "just because I desire something does not mean it is about me getting fulfillment."
[By fulfillment we would could mean even a little. A little can be very important to you. We are not discussing the notion that an altruistic person is not concerned about anybody else at all but themselves.]
At first glance, this statement appears to offer a healthy skepticism about assuming that all desires are self-centered or inherently purposeful. However, when examined more carefully, this claim risks oversimplifying the complexity of desire and its relationship to the self. Rather than outright denying a connection between desire and the self, a more nuanced approach is to recognize that because I desire something, it does not clearly mean it is not about me in some way that is important to me. This reframing preserves the mystery of desire while acknowledging that it remains tied to the self in significant, though perhaps obscure, ways.
The original assertion that desire is not necessarily about fulfillment is not, in itself, a fallacious argument from ignorance. It does not claim something is true merely because it hasn’t been proven false. Rather, it is an attempt to break the assumed link between wanting and self-gratification. However, when used to dismiss or neglect the possible involvement of the self in acts of desiring, it can become a reductive stance. In that sense, the claim risks becoming an evasion — sidestepping the deeper question of what desire actually reveals about who we are and what matters to us.
Desire is rarely a simple impulse. It emerges from layers of psychological, social, and existential processes that are often hidden from conscious awareness. When I desire something — a person, an experience, a form of recognition — it may not be immediately clear why I want it or what it means to me. However, this lack of clarity does not imply that the desire is disconnected from me or from what is meaningful in my life. Rather, it suggests that desire may be a language of the self — a way that deeper aspects of our identity, need, or longing try to express themselves.
Philosophical traditions have long acknowledged this mystery. Freud viewed desire as shaped by unconscious drives, often expressing unresolved conflicts or childhood experiences. Lacan took this further, arguing that desire is not about obtaining objects but is structured by language and the desire of the Other — suggesting a desire for recognition or completeness that is never fully satisfied. From another angle, Buddhism considers desire to be one of the roots of suffering, not because desire is evil, but because it often emerges from ignorance or illusion about the nature of self and reality. Nietzsche, too, saw desire not as a search for pleasure but as an expression of a deeper will to power — the drive to assert and expand one's existence.
These traditions differ in content but agree on one point: desire is not a
straightforward or surface-level phenomenon. It is not about just being kind or
good. If altruism is about those qualities then altruism, if possible, is one of
the weakest motives I have. When I desire something, it is often because it
represents — consciously or unconsciously — something significant to me. That
significance may lie in a personal history, a symbolic resonance, or an
existential need. Even if I cannot explain the origin or aim of a desire, it
would be a mistake to assume it is not "about me" in some important sense. The
fact that desire arises within me at all indicates that it bears some
relationship to who I am — even if that relationship is ambiguous or mysterious.
Thus, the more careful formulation — “because I desire something, it does
not clearly mean it is not about me in some way that is important to me” —
offers a philosophically richer and more honest approach. It neither naively
assumes all desires are self-fulfilling, nor does it prematurely sever desire
from the self. Instead, it acknowledges uncertainty while retaining a commitment
to self-inquiry. It respects the depth and mystery of desire and calls for
attentiveness rather than dismissal.
In conclusion, the relationship between desire and the self cannot be reduced to simple formulas. To desire is to be caught up in a process that both reveals and conceals aspects of who we are. Rather than denying the self’s involvement in desire, we should treat desire as an invitation to better understand ourselves — not always through analysis or control, but through reflection and openness to the ways we are shaped by what we long for.
3 WHAT IS WRONG WITH, "MY DESIRE BEING MINE DOES NOT MEAN IT IS IN ANY WAY ABOUT ME"
PREMISE 1, I know I have thoughts, beliefs and feelings I am not aware of
PREMISE 2, Where I find mystery in the other, I project - so what I think and feel tells me more about me than them
PREMISE 3, I am a mystery to myself as Socrates discerned when he cautioned, "Know thyself".
PREMISE 4, Paradoxically, I project my own notions unto myself as if I were the other
CONCLUSION, It is selfish to glorify myself in that way, therefore there is at least some selfishness in all I do
4 WHAT IS WRONG WITH, "MY DESIRE BEING MINE DOES NOT MEAN IT IS IN ANY WAY ABOUT ME"
It presupposes that altruism is the desire for another’s good that originates within the self but is not aimed at benefiting the self.
If it means that I am just a conduit for desire it dehumanises me. If altruism needs such a terrible notion then it is clearly not real or truly good.
Nobody believes such things. Do I believe the murderer who said Satan made him the medium of his infernal desires? Would you blame Satan and pity the murderer? Is Satan himself a conduit? Where does it stop?
CIRCULAR ARGUMENT
PREMISE 1 A desire being mine does not mean it necessarily is in any way about me.
PREMISE 2 I know this for people harm themselves and may die for strangers.
CONCLUSION Therefore altruism is possible.
PREMISE 1 thinks it matters. Most of us don't care as long as it is not, "A desire being mine does not mean it necessarily is secretly or ultimately about me."
Also, it should be, "A desire being mine does not mean it is consciously about me". That would mean we have no reason to think that a desire is or is not about you.
PREMISE 2 is wrong for it ignores how rewards are built into actions so the fulfilment and the action can be simultaneous.
The CONCLUSION does not follow. An act that is not about the self is not necessarily altruistic. Do you really think that an altruist would deliberately die so that little Jean can have ice cream? If I am not about myself, I can turn this to altruism or otherwise. Not being about me is not inherently altruistic.
Summary of the Logical Problems
The argument
is not logically valid and commits multiple errors:
Ambiguity Fallacy – Equivocates on what “about me” means.
Non sequitur – The conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises.
Circularity – It assumes altruism is possible by presuming that “not about me” equals altruistic, which is exactly what's at stake.
False cause – It assumes that the existence of self-harming behavior for others proves other-directed motivation, without accounting for internal payoffs.
So we successfully overthrow the arguments:
“a desire being mine does not mean it is about me in any way”
“a person dying for a stranger does not clearly exhibit altruism”
Then there is no way to demonstrate that altruism is plausible or
probable—because we have stripped away all criteria for identifying altruism in
action.
Altruism is popular in word and "example". How else would it be
on all our lips? Hypothetically, if persons could be altruistic, they are not
the ones representing it. That would rule out the Mother Teresa's of this world.
The paradox is that altruism can hardly qualify as unselfish when it is
based on wishful thinking, guesses, untruths and still takes itself seriously.
It looks self-righteous and patronising.