As famous as his novels were, Dostoevsky was very wrong indeed. He is not
the only one to claim that "if God does not exist, everything is permitted". It
is on the lips of nearly every person of faith today.
But it remains terribly flawed. If God exists and has control over outcomes,
He could allow any action and simply prevent harmful consequences—meaning divine
permission doesn't necessarily restrict wrongdoing. Moreover, if God does not
exist, it doesn't follow that everything is permitted. Without a divine
authority, there's no one to do the permitting in the first place. At most, it
would mean there’s nothing stopping you—an absence of external obstacles—not
that anything is morally or legally permitted. It’s more accurate to say that
without God, there may be no obstacle to doing whatever you choose, which
includes both harmful and helpful actions. Ironically, invoking God as a moral
gatekeeper risks justifying harmful acts if they are believed to be divinely
sanctioned.
If you had to choose between believing in a God who carries that risk, or
saying there is no God and no obstacle what would be? The latter does not
necessarily mean you will help nobody. In fact you would be helping people just
because you can and desire to. It would not be about what a God wants or any
heavenly or karmic reward.
Take this further. This is hypothetical. What if
it was deciding between an actual God or wishing he did not exist?
You would not choose the risk.
The claim that God is God of all including righteousness and morality is
clearly refuted.
The claim that without God all is permitted is shallow. On the emotional and
shock level, it is effective at coercing people, especially children and the
vulnerable, into compliance and belief.
Dostoevsky needed to be told that he may have given rise to a slogan that all
is permitted without God but that a slogan masks the complexity of the subject.
Let us explore some of that nuance.
We want a morality based on respect and justice. For the argument we are making, those two principles will suffice.
However, wanting respect and justice doesn’t necessarily mean we want them because of what they are in themselves. No one can truly prove that they value these principles purely for their own sake, rather than for the good results they bring.
In reality, respect and justice may rarely occur in life. Still, we do not give up on them. We reason that abandoning them would make things worse. We also argue that these values are correct and true, even if everyone else opposes them.
But here, we encounter a contradiction.
We criticize people like Sam Harris, who claim that morality is simply about
well-being. We argue that morality is more than that—that just because something
is good for us does not automatically make it morally right.
Yet at the same time, we admit that good results don’t make something morally wrong either. So we aren’t as confident in our moral foundation as we often claim.
We insist that certain actions—such as murder or adultery—are morally wrong in and of themselves. We claim that the reason these acts produce bad consequences is that they were already bad to begin with.
But this line of reasoning has flaws. Some argue that God designed the universe so that immoral actions would naturally lead to harmful consequences—that evil causes would create evil ripples.
To challenge this, we can use a hypothetical: imagine a world where adultery, instead of harming a marriage, actually strengthens it—because God designed it that way. If the consequences of a supposedly immoral act were positive, would it still be immoral? This suggests that God can separate the consequences from the action.
We said of Sam Harris: “Morality could be more than just well-being. Just because something is good for us doesn’t make it morally right.” But now we seem to be saying: “Bad consequences don’t make an action immoral, but they’re a good indicator that it is.”
So which is it?
While some argue we can recognize immorality without looking at
consequences, they also tend to say that in a hypothetical world where we had
nothing but consequences to judge by, that alone would be enough.
Morality, then, must be doing what helps others regardless of what you're told—not simply obeying authority or seeking positive outcomes. We must remember that true love is never a reward for obedience. A person who truly loves you stands with you—regardless of whether you're obedient to them, or to anyone else. That love is constant, not conditional.
In philosophy and debate, the burden of proof refers to the responsibility someone has to provide evidence or reasoning to support their claim. There is a burden of proof on the person who claims that God told them or guided them to perform a moral action.
And on the person who says that God's authority is the basis of morality.
And on the person who says that morality is relative, subjective or merely a
human construct.
And on the person who says that without God all is permitted.
To claim to be able to speak for the alleged ruler and maker of all demands a huge burden of proof. It is a very big claim.
Incidentally, it is said a burden of proof arises ESPECIALLY when a claim is controversial or goes against common assumptions. Actually, it is not about how controversial it is but about how large it is. Saying John ate porridge this morning does not need the same support as saying he levitated this morning does.
The idea of burden of proof is interesting—but what happens if others agree to carry that burden for you? But it is your claim! So that will not do. You know it best so you must give the evidence. What if God commands them to do so? There is a conflict then between your autonomy and obedience. God supposedly knows you as well as you do yourself so he can take the burden from you and give the information to somebody else to take it for you.
Now the burden of proof is a good test and a shield against heeding all you are told. God belief threatens it for you will find that if people who think they hear God take it for you, there will be nothing but confusion. It will not work.
We find that virtually nobody cares about showing they have the right under God to decreed what is moral. The result: justice, respect and compassion end up being things we go along with rather than deep principles.
Conclusion:
Dostoevsky’s claim that without God everything is permitted oversimplifies the
nature of morality. Real moral responsibility does not depend on divine
authority, fear of punishment, or reward. It lies in choosing respect, justice,
and love—freely, without coercion, and without expectation. That choice carries
more weight, not less, when made without a God to command it.
APPENDIX
Even if the arguments for God worked, there is still the proof of suffering - an all-good God cannot stand by and let a baby suffer for nothing - to stand against them.
You may say that suffering does not necessarily
refute God - it just might. Well if you take the baby's suffering and affirm
that you have no right to see the suffering of another as less than what it is
If there were proofs for God, then such evil would appear to us to be a
proof against them. We would be forced to just leave the question. That is what
you do if you have proofs for and against something.