FIRST
There is no good reason to think that a morally serious person must permanently commit to a single ethical theory. Common sense moral reasoning already operates by drawing on different moral considerations depending on context. Virtue ethics is appropriate when we are asking what kind of person one should be or what traits sustain a good life and a healthy society; utilitarian reasoning is appropriate when outcomes and harms must be compared, such as in policy or emergency decisions; pragmatism is useful when testing whether moral principles can actually guide action in real conditions; and a limited form of relativism is relevant when navigating social practices where coordination, tradition, and mutual understanding matter. Why not be an ethical sceptic or a nihilist at times - maybe just to get that art exhibition done?
These approaches are tools, not rival religions, and insisting on exclusive allegiance to one of them mistakes moral inquiry for ideology. What ultimately matters is not loyalty to a system but responsible judgment informed by character, consequences, experience, and social reality.
Morals boil down to - do fixed principles matter or should we break principles for the sake of good results?
The contrast between virtue ethics and outcome-focused moral theories such as utilitarianism is often taken to show that morality is incoherent or merely invented, but this conclusion does not follow. Virtue ethics emphasizes character, intention, and the kind of person one becomes, while consequentialist approaches focus on the goodness or badness of results; the disagreement shows that moral evaluation operates on more than one dimension, not that it operates on none. Many real practices—such as law, education, and personal relationships—evaluate both character and consequences without assuming that one must exclude the other. What this disagreement genuinely demonstrates is that morality is complex and sometimes indeterminate, not that moral claims are meaningless or false. At the same time, the existence of deep moral disagreement does not by itself prove that morality is objectively real; it shows only that moral reasoning is contested and difficult. Moral uncertainty is therefore compatible with both moral realism and moral anti-realism, and cannot by itself decide between them.
THE ARGUMENT
Ethical scepticism and ethical nihilism are often discussed together, but they are distinct positions and should not be conflated.
Ethical nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts: nothing is objectively right or wrong. On this view, moral claims do not describe any real features of the world. Actions such as harming a child are not morally right or wrong in any objective sense, even if we strongly condemn them emotionally or socially.
Ethical scepticism, in its weaker and more common form, does not deny the existence of moral truths. Instead, it questions whether human beings can know moral truths with sufficient certainty. The sceptic argues that moral disagreement, cultural variation, and the absence of decisive proof make moral knowledge unreliable or inaccessible.
These positions are often grouped together because persistent scepticism about moral knowledge can appear to undermine confidence in moral reality itself. However, it is important to distinguish denying moral knowledge from denying moral existence; the two claims are logically independent.
Any serious discussion of good and evil must address these challenges, because they raise fundamental questions about whether moral judgments can be justified and how moral disagreement should be handled.
Moral uncertainty and moral reasoning
Ethical sceptics often argue that competing moral theories—such as utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—conflict with one another and lack decisive rational proof. From this they infer that none can be known to be correct. However, disagreement alone does not show that all theories are equally flawed or that no moral reasoning is possible. In other domains, such as science or mathematics, disagreement motivates further inquiry rather than abandonment of truth altogether.
Even if certainty is unattainable, it does not follow that moral reasoning is pointless. We may still compare moral theories, assess their coherence, explanatory power, and consequences, and adopt those that seem best supported by reason and evidence.
Do ethical sceptics make moral claims?
Ethical scepticism does not necessarily commit one to endorsing violence or immorality. A sceptic may reject objective moral knowledge while still opposing harm on practical, emotional, or social grounds. However, critics argue that scepticism weakens the basis for moral condemnation, because it becomes harder to explain why certain actions should be opposed rather than merely disliked or discouraged.
Happiness, self-interest, and altruism
Many moral theories take human well-being or happiness seriously, even if they do not treat it as the sole moral good. While happiness is generally preferable to suffering, ethical reflection recognises that happiness can be pursued in harmful or unjust ways. The challenge is not to dismiss happiness, but to integrate it with other moral considerations such as fairness, harm, and responsibility.
Comte Altruism demands that you oppose your own rights to give them to the other. It is said that that is an example of how altruism is often misunderstood as requiring self-harm or self-neglect. In most philosophical accounts, altruism does not deny the value of one’s own well-being but holds that others’ interests also matter and should sometimes take priority. This tension between self-interest and concern for others is a central problem in ethics, not a definite refutation of morality itself.
Moral relativism
Moral relativism holds that moral judgments are true or false only relative to a culture or social framework. Critics argue that this view struggles to explain moral criticism across cultures. If moral rightness is entirely determined by cultural acceptance, then practices such as slavery or female genital mutilation would be morally right wherever they are endorsed, which many find unacceptable.
Relativists sometimes respond that their view explains moral diversity rather than justifying every practice. However, critics contend that relativism becomes unstable when it condemns intolerance or moral criticism, since such condemnation itself seems to rely on non-relative moral standards.
Pragmatism and truth
Pragmatism, particularly in its philosophical form, does not claim that truth has no relation to reality. Rather, it emphasizes that beliefs are evaluated by how well they function in guiding action and inquiry. Critics argue that if “what works” entirely replaces correspondence with reality, then the distinction between true and false beliefs becomes unclear. Defenders reply that pragmatic success is itself constrained by reality, since beliefs that fail to track reality tend not to work in the long run.
Conclusion
Ethical scepticism, moral relativism, and pragmatism raise important challenges to moral realism, but they do not conclusively refute the existence of moral truth. While moral certainty may be elusive, it does not follow that moral reasoning is meaningless or that all moral views are equally valid. The task of ethics remains to seek the most reasonable, coherent, and humane moral understanding available, even in the face of uncertainty.