FIRST
Religion says the problem of how God lets suffering and evil happen is not the point. What is the point is how nothing is really good unless there is a God. This is called the problem of good.
The discussion on the religion side seems to hide a need for God when it poses as making a case for God.
THE MANIPULATIVE SIDE OF THE PROBLEM OF GOOD ARGUMENT
The concepts of “good” and “moral good” are often conflated, yet they are distinct and operate at different levels of reality. Clarifying this distinction allows us to analyze the nature of morality without appeal to God and to address common philosophical confusions such as the Euthyphro dilemma.
Defining Good and Moral Good
We begin with precise definitions. Good refers to the state of affairs in which beings experience well-being, flourishing, or the absence of suffering. Importantly, good does not require the existence of moral agents. If nothing exists, there is no suffering, and the universe is in a state that is, in a sense, maximally “good,” insofar as suffering is zero. Good is therefore ontologically primary; it is a feature of the universe independent of any conscious agent.
Moral good, by contrast, is the action taken by free agents to realize, preserve, or maximize good. Moral good presupposes both the existence of good and the existence of agents capable of freely acting. Without good, moral action is meaningless, because there is nothing positive to realize. Without free agents, moral good cannot exist, because moral value requires choice rather than compulsion.
Implications for God and Morality
The distinction between good and moral good has significant consequences for theological claims about morality. If good exists independently, God is not necessary as a source of goodness. Moral good likewise does not require God; it requires only agents capable of acting freely in a world where good exists. Actions performed under compulsion, such as obeying a divine command without choice, are not truly moral, because they lack freedom. Hence, the moral value of an action does not depend on divine decree but on the freely chosen realization of good.
Furthermore, the common theological defense of evil as necessary for free will fails under this analysis. Free will is meaningful only insofar as it allows agents to realize good. A perfectly good universe could, in principle, allow free will while minimizing or eliminating unnecessary suffering. Free will alone does not justify pain; moral significance arises only from the ability to freely bring about good.
Good, Moral Good, and the Evidentialist Case Against God
Philosophical discourse about the existence of God often distinguishes between logical and evidentialist arguments from evil. Logical arguments claim that the existence of evil is contradictory with an all-good, omnipotent God. Evidentialist arguments, by contrast, do not claim contradiction but assert that certain evils make God’s existence highly improbable.
The distinction between good and moral good strengthens the evidentialist critique. Good, as a state of well-being or absence of suffering, is ontologically primary: it exists independently of agents and moral action. Moral good, on the other hand, is the product of free agents acting to realize good. This distinction is crucial because it shows that the existence of evil cannot be justified merely as a condition for free will or moral development. While moral good requires both freedom and the opportunity to act, good itself does not require agents; it simply is, or is not, in the world.
This ontological priority of good presents a challenge to theistic explanations. If God is all-powerful and perfectly good, He could, in principle, create a world in which good exists maximally while minimizing unnecessary suffering, without compromising moral agency. Horrendous evils—such as genocide, torture, or natural disasters causing indiscriminate suffering—appear gratuitous in this light. They are not necessary for moral good to exist, because good can exist independently of moral agents, and moral agents could still exercise free will in a world designed to prevent extreme suffering.
The evidentialist argument leverages this observation: even if God exists, the sheer extent and nature of certain evils make the existence of an all-good God highly unlikely. It is not about proving God impossible; it is about assessing plausibility. For evils that appear unnecessary or gratuitous—where no conceivable moral or spiritual purpose seems sufficient—the probability that a loving, omnipotent God exists diminishes significantly. Our experience of such suffering gives us prima facie reason to doubt the existence of a God who is both all-powerful and wholly good.
In this way, the ontological understanding of good strengthens the evidentialist critique. Good is independent and does not require God or moral agents to exist. Therefore, God cannot plausibly justify extreme evils as “necessary” for moral development or the realization of higher goods. The presence of these evils, when measured against the baseline of ontologically prior good, makes the existence of an all-good God implausible, not logically impossible, and justifies a rational skepticism grounded in the evidence of suffering.
Conclusion
It is not true that if you dismiss God, that you end up with no reason to believe in good. If somebody says, "I do not believe in good," they are paradoxically saying, "It is good to deny good." Good can be distorted but never avoided.
Good and moral good are distinct yet interconnected. Good is ontologically primary, existing independently of moral agents or God. Moral good arises when free agents act to realize good. Belief in God is neither necessary for moral action nor sufficient to ensure it. Morality, therefore, is about the autonomous realization of good, not obedience to divine command. By separating good from moral good, we can understand morality as a framework for action that respects both freedom and well-being, without requiring theological justification.
Religion does not really worry about the problem of good. It does worry about good not being a problem in the way it wants it to be. It could be seeing good in nature - and imagining that it is God. That way it finds God's presence in what suits it. In other words, it creates an idol. It does not matter if God exists or not, it is still idolatry.
APPENDIX
Premise 1: Human beings are fallible, biased, and capable of condoning harm to those they dislike or disregard.
Premise 2: Claiming to others that one knows objective morality grounded in God and/or what that morality demands is asking for trust when we are significantly risky.
Premise 3: Claiming can cause, justify harm and misuse of authority.
Conclusion: Therefore, when humans claim to know and teach morality grounded in God, it reveals a problem with the concept of objective morality and God, because such claims carry significant ethical risks.
NOTE: Most of us - if not all - understand evil inadequately. We say we know it when we see it but we don't really really know it. Given that human nature is so limited in discernment and our understanding is largely clouded, it should be taken as certain that believers are in fact condoning evil even if God really is good. They tend to condone - especially when the worst things seem to happen to other people.