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An argument saying extraordinary evidence for miracles is not needed

FOREWORD

The claim that miracles require extraordinary evidence is often contested by believers.

I wish to clarify that this evidence should be whatever puts a miracle claim beyond all reasonable doubt as true. Do not give the impression that you want unreasonable evidence.

The contesting is often done, particularly, by Christians. They argue that many improbable events occur and are accepted without requiring exceptional proof. They might suggest that, just like improbable historical events—such as Napoleon’s birthplace—miracles should be accepted without extraordinary evidence. However, the argument that extraordinary evidence is not necessary for miracles is flawed. While improbable events may not always require rigorous proof, miracles, by definition, are extraordinary claims that demand extraordinary evidence. The evidence for miracles often falls short, and skeptics argue that the higher the improbability of a claim, the greater the burden of proof. In this essay, we will explore why extraordinary claims, particularly miracles, must be met with extraordinary evidence, and how dismissing this principle leads to logical inconsistencies and deceptive reasoning.

It is important that we remember this, "Supernatural, superstitious or paranormal claims need to be put beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence simply because there always a window for deception or error to happen". That is what we should think of when we hear, "Extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence."

THE ARGUMENT
Christians often say that the principle—“if you make a huge claim, you need hugely good evidence”—is wrong. They seem to care about this principle only when their miracle claims are found wanting.

Against this principle, they argue that many things happen that are extremely improbable, and we do not demand extraordinary or exceptional evidence for them. For example, it was unlikely for Napoleon to have been born where he was born, considering that the world is so big. And we do not demand extraordinary or exceptional evidence for that. True. Why should we? He had to be born somewhere. What they fail to recognize is this: we do not need evidence for where Napoleon was born, but we do need evidence for miracles. We do not need extraordinary evidence before we believe where Napoleon's birthplace was. If we wanted to argue that Napoleon was born of a virgin by a miracle, we would need extraordinary evidence for that. Their argument is unreliable here. Though it is true that it is improbable that Napoleon should have been born at all, it is different from the improbability of his being born of a virgin. This principle is so simple and well-known that the likes of William Lane Craig denying it in The Case for Faith (pages 88–89, Lee Strobel, HarperCollins, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2000) can only be explained by willful misrepresentation.

Having the perfect hand in cards means you will win before the game begins. It is very unlikely for it to happen. But if somebody reliable tells you that they had such a hand, would it be wrong to disbelieve them just because it is very improbable? Christians say it would be wrong to, especially if they are a friend. Christians then argue, with skeptics, that the resurrection of Jesus, for example, should be a very improbable event. If it were not, it would not be a real miracle. Miracles are necessarily improbable and amazing events. Christians compare miracles to the perfect hand of cards as something that should be believed in, or at least as something that cannot be dismissed just because it is very improbable.

They deliberately overlook four things:

1 The perfect hand is not a serious matter for those who are told about it. It is no big deal if we believe it. A man rising again is a different matter. An investigation is necessary if we decide to try to believe, and a very big, in-depth one at that.

2 Perfect hands are naturally possible. Nobody can prove that dead men coming back to life is possible. If we could prove it was possible and explain it, it would not be a miracle.

3 Why should we accept or investigate the resurrection as if it should be given prime consideration? There are millions of rival miracles. Why should we single out the miracle that the Christian faith focuses on most for our undivided attention? Picking it out indicates that you are already assuming it is true or are actually assuming it.

4 It is possible to believe that a miracle may not have happened without dismissing it. It is possible to be skeptical and open to the idea that a miracle might have happened. Dismissing something is not the same as disbelieving it. Belief and unbelief are not full certainty. Dismissing something would be rejecting it outright and saying it is impossible. Disbelieving it is merely saying you don't have the right or enough evidence to believe but have enough to say it is probably untrue. It is based on evidence and thus open to further investigation.

Extraordinary claims require a degree and clarity of understanding that is equally extraordinary. But that is lacking in the witnesses to miracles. No top scientists experience apparitions of the Virgin Mary; it is usually uneducated children.

Just because something happened does not mean it should be believed. That depends on probability and evidence. The evidence you need must be in proportion to the likelihood of the claim. You would not believe that the local couch potato won a marathon, even though it is possible without a miracle. You would demand very good and serious evidence first. The more serious and harder-to-believe the claim is, the higher the standard of evidence you need. You need perfect and even better evidence for supernatural claims, and believers cannot provide that. They reject common sense and practice deception.

If evidence points to a man who cannot see at all as a serial killer who has been going out at night shooting people, then the evidence is fake because the probability of such a man being able to kill is too low. Probability is more important than evidence, and evidence depends on it for validity. There has to be a point at which even evidence should not be trusted. [This is hypothetical. We know evidence never lies. But what if it did? That is what we are talking about!] Miracle believers are trying to take that principle away from us. Yet they have the nerve to use the principle when it suits them. They complain that we say miracles are too unlikely to be believable, while they claim we do not know what is likely. They believe we do know what is likely. If they did not think their cars were likely to get them to work, would they have them? They try to intimidate and falsely accuse skeptics of irrationality.

Suppose the principle—that you need a lot of evidence and understanding before you can justifiably believe in a miracle—is wrong. Even if it is wrong, ideally we should have a lot of evidence and understanding. Believing without these things would be a necessary evil. It would not be something to celebrate but to be regretfully endured. It would be wrong to participate in Mass, for example. You would be honoring your faith in a miracle—the miracle of Jesus and his body and blood taking the form of food and drink. Such faith, even if necessary, should not be reveled in.

Miracle believers deny the principle. Murders happen, and yet we demand a huge pile of evidence before jailing killers because murders are out of the ordinary. Miracles are more uncommon than murders, and the same quantity of evidence would be insufficient for verifying them. Believers demand extraordinary evidence for extraordinary miracles they dislike, such as when Buddha reached enlightenment, but they do not for the miracles that suit their religious preferences. The evidence they present is only an excuse. They would believe, or think they believe, without it. Miracles invariably induce bigotry, dishonesty, and blindness—not very godly, are they?

The bigger the claims for a religion, the more understanding you should have of the why, what, and which of the religion's doctrine. To say you experienced a miracle that tells you the Roman Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ puts that burden on you. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. The stranger and more unusual the claim, the more evidence you need to justify accepting it as true.

Critics of this dogma say the problems are:

Skeptics say they want amazing evidence for an amazing claim and then, when they get it, they are still not satisfied and demand even more evidence, and on and on it goes—they are never happy. Paranormal believers say skeptics need to define what they need and how much of it, and not keep shifting the goalposts.

The truth: That has nothing to do with debunking the dogma. The principle is right, though the application may be flawed. Many skeptics, in fact, accept miracle claims on insufficient evidence. Others seek too much evidence and are never satisfied. Getting it right is hard. The abuse of the dogma does not refute the dogma.

Critics argue ad hominem—it says you do not need huge evidence for magical claims because needing that evidence means you want too much and will never be happy. An ad hominem argument attacks the person, not their arguments.

The truth: I am glad critics use the ad hominem because what else can they say? It proves that faith in magic is not harmless—it is potentially slanderous to honest seekers with skeptical minds.

Skeptics forget that what counts as an extraordinary claim differs from person to person and depends on circumstances. So, what is called extraordinary depends on what you believe is extraordinary. For example, Jesus instantly healing the sick would have been ordinary to his disciples, as they were used to seeing those miracles. But they are extraordinary to us.

The truth: This objection fails to distinguish between a claim being extraordinary in its nature and extraordinary in the sense that it provokes awe, wonder, and astonishment. The apostles got used to Jesus' miracles (if they happened as reported!). The miracles were still extraordinary despite the disciples’ familiarity. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence; even if people forget how bizarre it is, it needs an outstanding and very high level of evidence.

Skeptics forget that extraordinary evidence may exist, but people misinterpret it, so the evidence is not recognized for its power. For example, a birthmark that appears due to a spaceship's radiation might get a normal interpretation, even if the person carrying it knows differently.

The truth: All evidence is a matter of interpretation. We should accept natural, non-supernatural explanations and reject supernatural ones. Why? Because if we don't, we risk delusion. For example, if it is your twentieth birthday and you win twenty dollars in a draw, you will recognize it as chance rather than claiming it is a miracle.

As for the person with the burn knowing differently—do they really know? Are they lying or deluded?

Extraordinary things can be true, even without hard evidence. Perhaps evidence will be obtained one day. Thus, we should be open to the paranormal, but without extraordinary evidence, belief is unjustified.

The truth: True skeptics agree extraordinary things might have happened and left no evidence. They are willing to wait for evidence but cannot believe without it. To say we must believe based on evidence we may get one day is absurd.

Suppose Mary appeared miraculously at Lourdes in 1858. No matter how long we wait, we will never get hard extraordinary evidence for that, as it is in the past. This point does not help us.

The claim that extraordinary evidence is unnecessary assumes anything supernatural or paranormal is either impossible or extremely unlikely. Just because skeptic A was never abducted by aliens does not mean Jane couldn't have been. Rejecting the supernatural assumes it is very improbable, which is unproven—it is only an assumption. It is not fair to demand incredible evidence based on an assumption.

The truth: Believers themselves must admit that the paranormal is unlikely. To say otherwise would mean we should not investigate it. You don’t check supermarket prices assuming they are illegally overpriced; you assume they are roughly correct. Believers want us to ignore evidence of the paranormal. To say, "Don't bother checking" is the same as saying, "Damn the evidence!"

Skeptics who insist on excellent evidence for magical claims are accused of ignoring the evidence. They are said to hold on to their skeptical beliefs despite the evidence for the paranormal. This accusation is false and unfair. It proves that belief in the supernatural is implicitly arrogant—especially when believers refuse to recognize their own arrogance. If skeptics are arrogant, they are less so than believers. We should all be skeptics in that case.

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