The privation theory of evil, most famously articulated by Augustine, states:
Evil is not a real thing in itself.
It is merely the absence or lack of good—like darkness is the absence of light or cold is the absence of heat.
Good is primary, and evil is derivative.
Now, can this theory be applied to good? Let’s examine some possibilities:
Good as a lack of the best
This would define good as something less than perfect.
Problem: Good in itself is positive; it isn’t just “less than the best.” This doesn’t fit the privation framework, which treats evil as the derivative.
Good as a lack of neutral
Neutrality is neither good nor evil. Defining good as a lack of neutrality implies good exists only in opposition to neutrality, which is unusual and philosophically awkward.
Good as a lack of evil
This seems plausible at first, but it reverses Augustine’s framework. In the privation theory, good is fundamental and evil is the lack of good. Making good the lack of evil contradicts this order.
However, there is a speculative possibility:
Perhaps good could be a lack of something we haven’t yet identified—some reality or quality beyond our current understanding. Philosophically, this keeps the concept open-ended.
Conclusion:
The privation theory explains evil as a lack of good, but good itself is not a lack; it is the baseline reality. Trying to define good as a lack (of best, neutral, or evil) is inconsistent with the theory. But the theory does not prove that good itself is not a lack.