Stephen Hawking rejected the idea that God intervenes in the universe through miracles. He held that the universe operates according to natural principles and that apparent exceptions are either misunderstandings or phenomena not yet explained by science. In this view, miracles—understood as supernatural violations of nature—do not occur.
Religious traditions often distinguish miracles from magic, claiming that miracles are divine acts while magic is illegitimate or illusory. However, this distinction is largely definitional. Both involve events that cannot be explained by known natural processes. Reclassifying supernatural events as “miracles” rather than “magic” does not resolve the underlying epistemic problem: both appeal to causes outside nature.
If science were to verify an event that violated known physical laws, it would not conclude that “magic” or “the supernatural” had occurred. Instead, science would seek a broader or revised natural explanation. This approach does not undermine science; it reflects its methodological commitment to natural explanations rather than supernatural ones.
Creation and “Nothing”
Hawking argued that modern physics allows for models in which universes arise from quantum processes without requiring a divine creator. Critics sometimes interpret this as claiming that “something came from nothing by magic.” However, Hawking’s claim is not that absolute nothingness produced the universe, but that physical laws may allow spontaneous events without intentional agency.
Some argue that “power” must have caused the universe and identify that power with God. But this identification is not logically necessary. A power or process could exist without being a personal agent. Explaining creation in terms of impersonal laws does not entail belief in God, nor does creation alone prove divine agency.
If one insists that “nothing cannot produce something,” then invoking a divine being does not resolve the issue, since the same conceptual difficulty remains: how something arises from nothing. Appealing to God merely relocates the mystery rather than explaining it.
Miracles and Natural Law
Hawking regarded miracles as violations of natural regularities and therefore rejected them. However, he also acknowledged the indeterminacy implied by quantum mechanics. Importantly, indeterminacy itself is part of natural law. If unusual events occur because of quantum effects, they are still natural, not supernatural.
Claims that quantum indeterminacy allows for miracles therefore undermine the idea that miracles are supernatural. If an event is explained by physics, however rare or unexpected, it is not a miracle in the traditional religious sense.
It is more precise to speak of the uniformity of nature rather than “laws” of nature, since “law” can misleadingly suggest a lawgiver. Arguments that natural laws require a divine source depend on this ambiguity.
Methodological vs. Metaphysical Naturalism
A key distinction is between:
Methodological naturalism: the practice of seeking natural explanations for events, regardless of whether the supernatural exists.
Metaphysical naturalism: the belief that only natural things exist and that the supernatural does not.
Methodological naturalism is a practical approach used in science. It does not deny the possibility of miracles; it simply does not invoke them as explanations. Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophical position that requires stronger justification. Confusing these two leads to misunderstandings about the nature of scientific reasoning.
Evidence and Extraordinary Claims
The claim that Jesus rose from the dead is extraordinary because it contradicts well-established regularities of nature. For that reason, it requires exceptionally strong evidence. This principle is not unreasonable; it reflects ordinary standards of reasoning.
The lottery analogy helps clarify this point. That someone wins a lottery is not remarkable and requires little evidence. That a specific person won does require strong evidence. Similarly, that unusual events occur is uncontroversial; that a specific supernatural explanation is correct requires substantial justification.
Appeals to purpose—such as claiming the resurrection was necessary for salvation—do not establish that the event occurred. Purpose does not function as evidence. Moreover, if miracles are used to confirm religious truth, then miracle claims from other religions must be considered as well. Selectively accepting only those that support one’s own faith is methodologically inconsistent.
Supernatural Assumptions and Epistemic Risk
Miracle claims presuppose the supernatural. A believer interprets an unusual experience as a miracle because they already assume a supernatural cause. In this sense, the miracle does not function as independent evidence but as a reinterpretation of experience through prior belief.
This is why societies generally reject beliefs in magic such as people being transformed into animals. Such beliefs are excluded because they conflict with the assumptions that make everyday reasoning and social life possible. The same standard should apply consistently to all supernatural claims, including religious ones.
In daily life, when we encounter unexplained events, we admit ignorance rather than invoking supernatural explanations. This restraint is rational and practical. Abandoning it would erode the distinction between explanation and speculation.
Conclusion
Hawking’s position is that believers mistake unexplained natural phenomena for supernatural interventions. Even if nature is not perfectly uniform, we must assume sufficient regularity to reason, investigate, and live coherently. Miracles, as traditionally understood, depend on prior assumptions rather than providing independent evidence. For that reason, skepticism toward miracle claims is not dogmatic but methodologically justified.
Books Consulted
Is God a Human Invention? And Seventeen Other Questions Raised by the New Atheists, Sean McDowell and Jonathan Morrow, Kregel Publications, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2010
God and Stephen Hawking, Whose Design is it Anyway? John C Lennox, Lion, Oxford, 2010