INTRINSIC EVIL'S ELEMENT OF INTRINSIC GOOD
DEFINITIONS
Key Definitions
Intrinsic Evil: Evil that is inherently bad in itself, not dependent on external factors or consequences.
Intrinsic Good: Good that exists inherently within something, as part of its essential nature.
Extrinsic Good: Good that results from external factors or consequences, not inherent to the thing itself.
Evil as a Mere Lack: The view that evil is not a real entity but simply the absence or corruption of good.
Evil as a Real Substance: The view that evil is an actual, independent force or power that exists and acts on its own.
NOTE: Those are the two views of evil. Most tend to stand for one or the other. That nobody confesses that evil may exist under both definitions speaks of dishonesty.
The lack definition may seem to tell us that a good God can have evil in his creation and not be to blame for making it, for metaphysically there is nothing there to make. But that is only a may. He could engineer the lack. Paradoxically, being convinced that God is good is going too far. The definition forbids that.
The substance definition, of course, would assert that if there is a God, he directly made evil. We caution that if some people think they can get him on their side, they do not care if he has a malicious side.
Far from opposing intrinsic evil fully, no believer in God can show their worship is intrinsically free from it. The believer will say that letting the supernatural in when you are not sure what you are letting in is tacitly admitting evil in. "Maybe evil lurks in this thing. I invite it in anyway."
THE ARGUMENT
The religions and philosophies of today usually say that good just exists and has an independent existence. They add that evil does not have an independent existence and needs good to grow on like a fungi, a parasite. This is the lack theory.
But good must be flawed if the fungi can grow on it. The fungi does have independent existence. If you look at fungi, there is something there.
Also, if the notion that good is a substance is bizarre. It has the
fallacy of reification written all over it. An abstract value is not
a substance.
They seem to think that good is a pure substance, but if that is so,
what about impure good? What if there is also pure evil and impure
evil as in substance?
What if the good is always grey? What if the grey is so light that we think it is pure white good?
If oil—evil—does not mix with water—good—it is the same to us as if it does. Even if good is pure, we can only see grey, for we are just imperfect creatures. We look at it through our lens. If good is grey, then if we claim to be firm in our moral rules, we are either pretending or just using morality as an excuse for feeling in control.
If evil is a form of good, if it is good in the wrong place at the wrong time, then it is inevitable that some good can come of it. But if you believe in God, you believe that God works to bring more good out of it that would not happen without his intervention.
This view means you will not take evil that seriously. Good is not that great when it needs help from God to get stronger. To not take good seriously is not to take evil with any sense of importance or urgency.
If you do take evil seriously, that will not last long.
If you do take it seriously, then if you are doing so in spite of your faith, then you need to consider abandoning your faith in God.
And you risk seeing the good that was to happen anyway as the work of God. You will never know what was intervention and what was the natural consequence.
You don’t want to mistake the natural consequence for God’s intervention and his taking control of the mess. Why?
It means that you mistake what is not evidence for God as evidence.
You risk dimming your understanding of how terrible what is happening is. That is a reduction of compassion and empathy.
Evil has a good side insofar as it is good that is mistaken for proper good. The good in evil is intrinsic.
The good that follows evil is extrinsic.
The good that is intrinsic and has to happen is the good that is mistaken for God working to bring good out of the evil. God working on evil to bring good out of it is impossible to believe. If selfish Joan gets kinder because she has suffered a car crash and this kindness is not intrinsic, then rather than God bringing good out of what happened to her, he in fact created a brand new good. The kindness following the crash does not mean the kindness was in any way caused by the crash. Not all things that look like causes actually are.
To say then that the good that is intrinsic is not as important as the extrinsic good makes no sense. If you really believe evil is part of God's loving plan, then you have to praise the good in the evil right now instead of waiting to see its allegedly good consequences. It is bad enough to look at them and say the evil was God's plan. But it is worse to say that BEFORE any good results arise!
Conclusion Summary
Evil contains an intrinsic element of good, but this good is often mistaken for true, proper good.
The good that follows evil (extrinsic good) is separate from the intrinsic good found within evil itself.
The common religious notion that God brings good out of evil by intervention is problematic—what appears as “good from evil” may actually be a new good created independently, not caused by evil.
Believing evil is part of God's loving plan requires praising the intrinsic good within evil now, not just waiting for possible future good outcomes.
Viewing evil merely as a lack or denying its substance ignores the complexity of good and evil as intertwined and imperfect, often “grey” rather than purely white or black.
Taking evil seriously while maintaining faith in God demands careful discernment, avoiding mistaking natural consequences for divine intervention.
Misattributing natural consequences to God risks reducing empathy and compassion, by dulling our understanding of evil’s true severity.
Ultimately, if evil is truly part of a divine plan, it challenges believers to confront and praise the intrinsic good in evil itself immediately, rather than deferring judgment until extrinsic good may appear.