A POINT
If I have the right to presume that a statue of Jesus can eat a steak, I cannot complain if somebody presumes that 2+2 are miraculously 5. What? 2+2 cannot be 5! Not the point. God can make them as good as 5. For example, when you add 2 apples to 2 apples you find 5 there. He is either altering your perception or creating a extra apple. He can simulate 2+2=5.
ANOTHER
William Lane Craig argues that once the existence of God is assumed, belief in miracles becomes more reasonable. However, this move quietly introduces an additional assumption: that God, if he exists, does or is likely to perform miracles. The existence of God alone does not logically entail divine intervention in the natural order.
Craig’s argument also assumes more than is necessary about the nature of the cause of the universe. Even if one grants that the universe has an intelligent cause, this does not require that the cause be a personal, interventionist God in the classical theistic sense. An impersonal or minimally personal intelligence could be sufficient to bring about the existence of the universe without engaging in ongoing miraculous activity.
By moving directly from “an intelligent cause exists” to “a personal God who performs miracles exists,” the argument exceeds what the evidence supports. This is an instance of explanatory overreach: attributing additional properties—such as personal agency, moral intentions, and miraculous intervention—without independent justification.
We have learned that miracles invite too many guesses and assumptions.
THE ARGUMENT
Belief in miracles rests on a chain of significant assumptions. They are too many. They are too big. Better not to take the trouble and hold that some error or lie is behind the report.
A miracle is usually defined as an event that cannot occur through natural processes and is instead attributed to supernatural or divine intervention. Common examples cited include Marian apparitions, unexplained recoveries from illness, reported phenomena involving religious objects, the solar event at Fatima in 1917, and, most centrally for Christianity, the resurrection of Jesus after nearly three days of death. These events are typically said to be acts that only God can perform.
For many religions, miracles play a foundational role. If miracles are dismissed as false or unreliable, key religious claims lose their support. Christianity depends on the resurrection, and Islam depends on the divine origin of the Qur’an. When miracle claims are selectively accepted or rejected based on prior beliefs, the issue becomes less about evidence and more about which witnesses or traditions one chooses to trust.
Core Principles
1. Extraordinary claims require heightened scrutiny.
Claims that contradict or exceed our understanding of nature demand
more careful examination than ordinary claims. If something appears
to violate natural laws, it should not be accepted casually.
2. Not all assumptions are equal.
Some assumptions fit the evidence better than others. For example,
it is reasonable to assume a wet carpet was caused by a dog rather
than by spontaneous appearance, because the former fits what we
already know. Assumptions should not contradict evidence; they
should be constrained by it.
3. Assuming is not the same as believing.
Many people think they believe in miracles, but in practice they
merely assume they occur without critically examining that
assumption.
4. Beliefs can be questioned.
If someone claims to believe something extraordinary, it is
reasonable to examine whether that belief is supported by evidence
or rests primarily on assumptions.
Problems in Defending Miracle Claims
Miracle believers often argue that skeptics merely assume miracles are impossible. For example, Christians may claim that saying “dead people do not rise” is an unjustified assumption, because a power greater than nature—God—could override natural processes. However, this response introduces a larger assumption: that such a being exists and intervenes in this way. Appealing to divine power does not resolve the problem; it shifts it.
Some philosophers, such as William Lane Craig, argue that once God’s existence is assumed, miracles become more likely. But this reasoning places the conclusion before the evidence. One must first establish that God performs miracles before using miracles as evidence for God. Otherwise, the argument becomes circular.
The Weight of Assumptions
Accepting a miracle claim requires multiple assumptions:
that the witnesses were reliable,
that no natural explanation exists (even one not yet understood),
that the event was genuinely supernatural,
and that it was caused by a particular deity.
Natural explanations can be incomplete or mistaken without being supernatural. Saying “we do not yet understand this” is not the same as saying “this was a miracle.” To prefer a miracle explanation simply because it avoids accusing witnesses of error ignores the fact that human perception, memory, and reporting are often flawed in subtle ways.
Additionally, there is no reliable method to test whether an apparent miracle is deceptive, misinterpreted, or caused by something unknown. Even if one assumes that only God can raise the dead, an unusual event alone cannot demonstrate that God directly caused it.
The Spirit or God realm?
Moreover, introducing a “spirit world” does not reduce these assumptions—it increases them. If such a realm exists and operates according to regular rules, which it must to be a home or world at all - then those rules are themselves unknown and untestable. This doubles the explanatory burden: one must assume both the existence of an unseen domain and knowledge of how its rules operate well enough to identify a specific divine action.
The Role of Occam’s Razor
Occam’s Razor advises us to prefer explanations that make the fewest assumptions. If a wrapped gift appears on a table, it is more reasonable to assume a person placed it there than to propose a supernatural being did so. Abandoning this principle leads to absurdity, where any explanation—no matter how exotic—must be treated as equally credible.
If we allow miraculous explanations freely, we undermine rational inquiry. We could excuse any false belief or mistaken conclusion by appealing to divine intervention, making evidence meaningless and society unworkable.
Evidence and Interpretation
If miracles are impossible or extremely unlikely, then evidence for them is best understood as misleading or incomplete rather than decisive. Belief in miracles does not arise from evidence alone; it depends on the prior assumption that miracles are possible. That assumption then shapes how evidence is interpreted.
Basing belief in God primarily on such interpretations risks turning belief into a projection of one’s own ideas rather than a response to reality. If any interpretation can be justified by invoking the supernatural, reason itself loses its authority.
Conclusion
Belief in miracles ultimately depends on a series of layered and often unexamined assumptions. From assuming that supernatural events can occur, to assuming they are caused by a specific deity, each step moves further away from what can be independently verified. While miracles are often presented as evidence for divine action, that evidence only appears convincing to those who already accept the possibility of miracles. Without those prior assumptions, miracle claims lose their force and remain matters of personal interpretation rather than objective proof.