Key Definitions
Objective Morality
The view that some actions are truly right or wrong independently of what any person or society thinks or feels. Moral truths are discoverable, not invented, and remain true even if everyone disagrees with them.
Subjective Morality
The view that moral judgments depend on individual feelings, attitudes, or beliefs. An action is “wrong” only because a person sees it that way. There are no mind-independent moral facts.
Cultural (or Social) Relativism
The view that moral right and wrong are determined not by individuals but by societal norms. Something is “wrong” if the society disapproves of it, even if another society approves.
(Note: This is a type of subjectivism, but at the group level rather than the individual level.)
Moral Constructivism
The view that morality isn’t discovered or purely subjective—rather, it is built through reasoning, shared principles, and social agreement. Moral rules are created, but not arbitrarily.
Moral Error Theory
The view that all moral claims try to describe objective facts, but all of them are false, because no such moral facts actually exist.
Moral Internalism
The idea that a person’s moral judgments are closely tied to their motives or conscience. If you sincerely think something is right, you will be motivated to do it.
Moral Blameworthiness vs. Moral Wrongness
Moral wrongness: What is objectively or socially judged to be wrong.
Blameworthiness: Whether the person knew or intended to do wrong. Someone may do a wrong action without being personally blameworthy.
Epistemic Subjectivity
Our fallible, personal way of understanding what is right or wrong. Even if morality is objective, our access to it is subjective.
THE ARGUMENT
Subjective morality” does not usually mean “anything goes based on feelings.”
There are several distinct positions:
Individual subjectivism: “X is wrong” means “I disapprove of X.”
Cultural relativism: “X is wrong” means “my society disapproves of X.”
Error theory (Mackie): All moral claims purport to be objective, but they’re all false.
Constructivism (Kant, Rawls): Morality is constructed, not discovered, but not arbitrary.
Suppose someone holds that there are no objective moral truths and that what we call “morality” is ultimately a set of personal or cultural preferences.
In that case, appealing to God as the source of morality does not solve the problem of subjectivity. Our judgment that God’s commands are morally authoritative would itself be a subjective judgment. We would still be using our own preferences or feelings to decide that God is a trustworthy moral guide.
If morality is subjective from the start, then choosing to follow God’s supposed commands simply adds another layer of subjectivity:
your own subjective evaluation of God, and
the moral standards you believe God endorses.
By contrast, if you simply invent your own moral preferences without appealing to an external authority, you are working with only one layer of subjectivity instead of two.
Furthermore, if one already believes that all moral judgments—including “lying is wrong”—are subjective, then claiming that God provides an objectively binding moral law would be inconsistent. The claim that God grounds morality presupposes objectivity, while subjectivism denies it.
Many people argue that once belief in God is removed, morality becomes entirely a human creation. On that view, moral rules are not discovered but made, and our commitment to them depends on human judgments rather than divine authority.
Not all moral subjectivists say that morality is mere preference. Many hold that our preferences may help us happen to be objectively right.
Actual moral deliberation, the subjective elements — our emotions, perceptions, limitations, and pressures — usually outweigh the influence of any conscious concern for objective moral truth.
This is well-supported by:
moral psychology (Haidt: moral reasoning is mostly intuitive)
cognitive science (dual-process theory: intuition > deliberation)
philosophy (Hume: reason is the slave of the passions)
everyday observation
People want to know what is truly right, but their actual reasoning is shaped more by inner subjectivity than by detached concern for objective correctness.
In high-pressure, confusing, and urgent moral situations, subjective factors—fear, emotion, stress, instinct, upbringing, and personal interpretation—inevitably dominate the decision-making process far more than any calm attempt to determine the objectively correct moral answer.
Most moral subjectivists do not claim that one must obey immoral laws, such as a law commanding child abuse. We have reason to suspect that this claim might not be very strong.
Certain forms of cultural relativism—a specific kind of subjectivism—can lead to the implication that what a society approves of becomes “right” within that society. This does not mean all subjectivists endorse such conclusions, but it shows a potential difficulty for views that locate moral authority solely in social conventions.
Consider another example: if someone sincerely believes that praying is a good and holy act, then on many ethical theories—including those found in religion—they may not be personally blameworthy even if prayer were, in fact, morally wrong. Their moral responsibility would depend on their intentions and the limits of their knowledge. This resembles the idea that conscience plays a decisive role in moral judgment, which can drift toward a practical form of moral subjectivism, even if no one explicitly endorses full subjectivism.
The shift from respecting conscience to embracing a largely subjective approach to moral decision-making is small, and under certain conditions practical subjectivism can evolve into a fully subjectivist outlook.
Some moral subjectivists also claim that the idea of moral “progress” is incoherent. If moral values are entirely products of human imagination, then improving the world—for example, by eradicating cancer—is not morally “better” in any objective sense, but simply a change that we happen to prefer. On this view, “progress” becomes a matter of preference rather than an objective improvement.
Moral subjectivism struggles to account for genuine moral disagreement. If morality were purely subjective, statements like “murder is wrong” would only reflect personal feelings. Yet, people frequently argue about moral issues as if some answers can be right or wrong. This implies there are objective standards guiding moral correctness. For instance, when societies condemn slavery or genocide, they appeal to more than individual preference—there seems to be a fact of the matter about justice or harm, which moral subjectivism cannot adequately explain.
APPENDIX
How Much Subjectivity Is Required to Learn Morality?
A well-balanced, defensible answer is:
1. Epistemically: a lot of subjectivity
We perceive, interpret, reason, and emote subjectively.
2. Metaphysically: maybe none
The underlying moral truth (if it exists) is not made subjective by our subjective perception of it.
3. Practically: it varies
Under pressure, uncertainty, or lack of information, subjective judgment increases.
4. In law and policy: minimal subjectivity
Societies need relatively stable, intersubjective norms to function.
APPENDIX - OTHER POINTS
Objective morality can function like a test or “theory” in practice because of human fallibility.
Subjectivism can psychologically feel coercive if it binds people to their own feelings