Natural law morality is a philosophical and theological idea that moral principles can be derived from the nature of humans and the world around us. Historically associated with thinkers like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, it suggests that by observing human nature and the order of the world, we can identify what is right and wrong. Traditionally, it has been assumed that what is “natural” is morally good and what is “unnatural” is morally wrong. Natural law often labels certain acts as wrong in themselves, not because of the consequences but because they go against the natural purposes God (or nature) has given. This is very similar to absolutism.
Natural law’s focus on human nature and purpose gives it a rationale for why acts are intrinsically wrong, whereas absolutism may simply assert that some acts are wrong without needing a natural or teleological justification.
The relationship between nature and morality is complex. Just because something occurs naturally does not mean it is morally desirable, and conversely, not all human-created or “unnatural” actions are wrong. A closer examination reveals a more nuanced understanding of natural law and its application to ethics. The following ten insights challenge conventional assumptions about natural law morality.
Rethinking Natural Law: Ten Original Insights
Conventional discussions of natural law often assume that what is “natural” is inherently good, and what is “unnatural” is inherently wrong. A closer look, however, suggests a more nuanced view. Here are ten insights that explore morality beyond simplistic appeals to naturalness.
1. Nature produces traits that can be harmful or morally neutral
Not all traits that arise naturally are morally relevant. For example, humans are born with sexual drives regardless of whether they will act on them, and some traits can lead to harmful behavior if acted upon. This illustrates that “natural” does not automatically equate to “good” or morally instructive.
2. Ordinary acts challenge the idea that “unnatural = wrong”
Humans routinely engage in acts that are technically “unnatural”: wearing glasses, eating sweets for enjoyment, drinking alcohol, or undergoing cosmetic procedures. These examples show that the mere fact that an action is unnatural does not, by itself, make it morally wrong.
3. Natural law can be considered independently of divine authority
It is possible to think of natural law as a guide to ethics without assuming it is enforced by God. Even if one believes in God, moral reasoning based on human flourishing, harm reduction, and well-being can operate independently of divine command.
4. Pleasure can be morally neutral or positive in itself
Pleasure is not always a tool for survival or reproduction. People laugh, enjoy music, or eat for enjoyment, and these experiences can have intrinsic value without necessarily causing harm. Pleasure, when it does not harm oneself or others, can be morally acceptable.
5. Moral evaluation cannot rely on “unnaturalness” alone
If an action is deemed wrong merely because it is unnatural, the same reasoning could imply that life-saving medical interventions (e.g., organ transplants) are also wrong. This shows that appeals to naturalness alone are insufficient for moral evaluation; consequences and harm must be considered.
6. Normality is not a guide to morality
The fact that most people engage in or approve of a behavior does not make it morally good. Similarly, rare or unconventional behaviors are not automatically wrong. Moral reasoning must distinguish between descriptive norms (what is common) and prescriptive norms (what is right).
7. Sexual preferences, including fetishes, can be morally neutral
Sexual attraction varies widely, and preferences—including fetishes—do not inherently cause harm. Evaluating morality solely based on conventional notions of naturalness can misrepresent the diversity and harmlessness of human sexual behavior.
8. Pleasure and morality
Some moral systems restrict pleasure to secondary purposes, such as survival or reproduction. While these systems may have internal consistency, it is possible to recognize that pleasure itself can be morally neutral or positive when it does not harm others.
9. Misuse, rather than nature itself, often causes harm
Natural objects or forces can be harmful only when misused. For instance, poisonous mushrooms are dangerous if eaten, but not inherently wrong. This highlights that morality should focus on outcomes and human agency rather than labeling natural phenomena as intrinsically immoral.
10. Consequences matter alongside intrinsic considerations
Actions should be evaluated by considering their consequences. For example, harming oneself or others is wrong not because the body has a “natural purpose,” but because of the harm it causes. Moral reasoning that considers both intrinsic aspects and consequences is more reliable and humane.
Conclusion
Natural law is more complex than simple appeals to what is natural or unnatural. Nature alone does not provide a perfect moral guide. Ethical evaluation should consider harm, misuse, pleasure, and human flourishing. By moving beyond rigid appeals to naturalness, we can develop a more nuanced and practical understanding of morality.
APPENDIX
For St. Thomas Aquinas, the main proponent of natural law theory, morality can be discerned through the observation of nature because he believed that God designed the world with a purpose. According to this view, understanding the natural purposes of things can guide us in determining what is morally right or wrong.
Some thinkers interpret natural law as flowing from the structure of nature itself rather than being directly imposed by God. In this perspective, moral truths—such as prohibitions on certain sexual behaviors—are seen as consequences of the way humans are naturally constituted, with God’s role being indirect as the creator of nature. Protestants often emphasize that natural law provides a moral framework that relies more on reason and observation of nature than on divine grace, while some atheists also adopt natural law reasoning as a secular guide to ethics.
This understanding of natural law suggests that Christians do not have a monopoly on discerning right from wrong; people of different religions—or even no religion—can reason about morality based on human nature and the consequences of actions. Traditional Church teachings, however, maintain that adherence to Christianity is necessary for salvation, which creates a tension: if natural law is universally accessible to human reason, then rigid religious claims about salvation may conflict with the broader ethical insights that anyone could discover.
A natural law perspective implies that moral reasoning should be guided by careful observation, rational reflection, and openness to correction, rather than strict adherence to dogma. Critics argue that some religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, are slow to adjust moral rules even when evidence suggests change would prevent serious harm—for example, its continued prohibition on condom use despite the impact on HIV/AIDS prevention.
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PRACTICAL ETHICS, Peter Singer, Cambridge University Press, England, 1994
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The WEB
Roman Catholic Ethics: Three Approaches by Brian Berry
www.mcgill.pvt.k12.al.us/jerryd/ligouri/berry.htm