Nature: The regular, observable patterns and laws governing the physical world.
Miracle: An event that appears to violate or go beyond natural laws.
Testimony: Evidence given by people based on their observations or experiences.
Uniformity of Nature: The consistent and predictable behavior of natural laws over time.
Believability: The degree to which a claim is reasonable or convincing based on evidence.
Bias: A tendency to interpret information in a way that supports a preconceived idea.
If miracles happen, they may not present themselves as obvious violations of natural law but instead could disguise themselves within the appearance of natural regularity. This possibility means that what we observe as ordinary or consistent could, in fact, be shaped by hidden miraculous activity. If so, our senses are not detecting reality directly but are being “managed” by an underlying force, which weakens our trust in perception itself. A miracle that blends seamlessly into nature undermines the idea that we can reliably distinguish between natural and supernatural events. As a result, the more miracles masquerade as natural occurrences, the more fragile our confidence in the uniformity of nature becomes—ultimately casting doubt on whether what we call “evidence” can ever be trusted at face value.
This issue becomes especially troubling in a world where many people experience dissociative tendencies and related psychological conditions—such as dissociative identity disorder (DID), depersonalization, or derealization—which are reportedly on the rise. These conditions already impair a person’s sense of what is real, blurring the line between internal experiences and external reality. If we accept the possibility that miracles can tamper with nature while still appearing natural, we further destabilize the foundation of shared reality. In such a framework, any event—no matter how ordinary—might secretly be miraculous, deceptive, or manipulated. For individuals already struggling to maintain a stable sense of the world, this opens the door to deeper confusion, paranoia, or delusion. It erodes the grounding that science, shared perception, and reason provide. In short, if miracles can masquerade as natural events, and we accept that premise, we risk feeding into a dangerous cognitive environment—one in which certainty, trust in the senses, and mental stability become increasingly fragile.
What if the regularity we observe in nature is itself a kind of miracle? It is possible that nature appears orderly because some underlying cause prevents us from perceiving its true complexity or irregularity. We should not assume that something counts as a miracle only when it is immediately obvious as one. To do so risks a form of bias: assuming that if a miracle occurs, we would automatically recognize it as such. In fact, the recognition of a miracle depends on our interpretation.
Some religious thinkers claim to approach miracle claims without bias, but they often start with a definition of miracles that influences how they interpret the evidence. This presupposition can shape their conclusions.
If we consider the universal experience of nature’s order as a miracle, then what we call “miracles” in the usual sense might be seen as competing interpretations of reality. The overarching “miracle” of nature’s consistency could overshadow other miracle claims. It is important to remember that what we classify as miracles may vary, and they can compete for explanatory power.
Considering the options: either Jesus rose from the dead, or nature is regular and dead people do not rise. Alternatively, nature’s regularity itself might be considered a miracle, affirming that dead men do not rise. If this is the case, then Hume’s argument—that only nature should be considered—is incomplete. Recognizing nature as a kind of miracle might actually strengthen the argument that dead men do not rise.
Seeing that nature is regular means seeing it as regular enough to justify disregarding (as opposed to dismissing) miracle claims. This is the testimony of evidence. The testimony of people about evidence is another testimony. The smoking gun speaks. So does the person who finds it. That is often treated as one testimony when it is two. Dismissing the miracle is not claiming to know it did not happen, but claiming to know that it should be treated as if it did not or is uninteresting. Nature is to “blame” not us for it being right not to believe in miracles.
Hume asserted that nature being regular is enough to show that miracles should be regarded, for the sake of argument, as false. Strict, rigid natural law that does not change is unnecessary. He asserted that the quantity and quality of miracle evidence so far could not match nature’s reliability. He is not saying the quality and quantity don’t have any value at all. Life is about weighing one evidence against the other. You would not be doing that unless you took both sides of the evidence seriously and as having some value.
In short, it is more likely that John who said he spoke to Jesus is lying or mistaken than that Jesus really appeared to him. Maybe he did, but we cannot trust enough to take John seriously. It is clear, though, that when Hume wrote that we should believe in a miracle if it would be more miraculous for the person to be lying or wrong than for the miracle to be real, he was talking about believability and was not saying miracles are just impossible. He was too smart to just assume the truth of what he knew he needed to show instead of just showing it.
The quality of evidence for a miracle, or indeed anything, matters more than the quantity. The quality of evidence does not mean you can show or know it is good quality. The trouble with quantity is that you will not know which evidence is quality and which is not. Luck and coincidence can make evidence look like it is good quality when, in fact, it is not.
If nature tells you x is a miracle, then a miracle asks for a high standard of evidence that surpasses evidence for a natural event. A man rising from the dead asks for evidence that nature could not do it and that it happened. A man staying dead does not need the same evidence because the evidence is not throwing up a challenge to nature.
Some say Hume said that nature is closed as a system and miracles do not happen. Others say he merely said that miracles, even if they do happen, are not believable, for a lot of evidence stands against them. For example, dead men stay dead, which overrules the evidence that there was an exception. Others say that he was not dismissing miracles which have good evidence but was just thinking none he knows of were impressive. Christians find no problem with this soft interpretation.
If Hume is right and there is a God, then it follows that miracles such as Jesus rising from the dead—though they appeal to God—are hypocritical, godless superstition. But Hume’s argument still works if you say nature is uniform enough. He is not begging the question. To say uniform experience is against miracles is not saying the miracle did not occur but saying it is not convincing enough, even if the uniformity is not rigid. If natural law can be loose, then we cannot be sure a miracle is ever a miracle.
If a miracle is not believable, then if it has happened, it is not the action of a loving, kind God of truth.