A SYLLOGISM
David Hume famously argued that testimony can justify belief in a miracle only if denying that testimony would require accepting something even more miraculous. In order to avoid using the term miracle within the standard of evaluation itself, I amend Hume’s formulation by replacing it with the concept of a greater wonder. That opens the argument to accepting great quality evidence - not necessarily miraculous. I wish to avoid being too severe.
The argument can then be stated as follows:
Syllogism (Humean Testimony Principle — Amended)
Premise 1:
A rational person should accept testimony for an extraordinary event
only if denying that testimony would require accepting an even
greater wonder.
Premise 2:
Human error, deception, or misunderstanding is always less wondrous
than a violation of the laws of nature.
Premise 3:
Testimony for a miracle can always be explained by human error,
deception, or misunderstanding.
Conclusion:
Therefore, testimony alone is never sufficient to rationally justify
belief in a miracle. It will not suffice as the main justification
either - yet miracles heavily depend on what witnesses say.
THE ARGUMENT
A miracle is typically defined as an event that is not naturally possible—something supernatural or paranormal. Religions often claim that God performs miracles to demonstrate his existence or to communicate religious truths. Because miracles allegedly suspend or override the laws of nature, they are, by definition, extraordinarily improbable events.
For that reason, no one has the right to demand belief in a miracle solely on the basis of testimony. Accepting such claims without direct experience would require abandoning ordinary standards of reason that we apply to every other extraordinary claim. Doing so would undermine both rational judgment and intellectual integrity.
Religious traditions often claim that God established the laws of nature but occasionally violates them—for example, by raising the dead—to convey a religious message. In this view, miracles function as signs or teaching tools. However, this raises an important question: if miracles are meant to communicate truth, why should belief depend almost entirely on hearsay rather than personal experience?
In ordinary life, we recognize that some claims are so extraordinary that they require firsthand confirmation. If someone claimed to witness a miracle proclaiming an obviously false or absurd religious message, most believers would reject it—even if it appeared convincing. This shows that testimony alone is not sufficient for belief, even within religious frameworks. Therefore, there must be a category of claims that require direct experience to justify belief. Miracles clearly belong in that category.
Miracles are extraordinary claims, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. In the case of miracles, the only evidence proportionate to the claim is direct observation or personal experience. Reports, no matter how sincere or numerous, are always weaker than firsthand experience. This is not bias; it is the same standard we use in everyday reasoning. We do not accuse someone of a serious crime unless we see compelling evidence for ourselves.
Historical miracles, such as the resurrection of Jesus, therefore fall short of the evidence required to justify belief. No modern person can independently verify the burial, the guarding of the tomb, the absence of interference, or the alleged appearances afterward. Accepting such a claim requires reliance on ancient testimony, which is far weaker than direct observation.
Even within religious traditions, miracles are inconsistently evaluated. Many alleged miracles are rejected, while a small number are accepted, often based on institutional authority rather than clear epistemic principles. If miracles were intended as reliable signs, we would expect them to be clear, public, and unambiguous—not rare, disputed, and dependent on trust in fallible human witnesses.
Moreover, miracles frequently convey contradictory messages. Different religions report miracles that support mutually exclusive doctrines. This shows that miracles, as reported, cannot function as reliable indicators of truth. A sign that points in multiple, incompatible directions is not a sign at all.
Importantly, believing a miracle you personally witness does not obligate you to accept the religion it allegedly supports. Even a directly observed anomaly could be misinterpreted, staged, or unrelated to the theological conclusion drawn from it. A God who revealed crucial truths only through rare, ambiguous events witnessed by very few would not be acting in a clear, honest, or reliable manner.
David Hume argued that belief in a miracle is justified only if the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous than the event itself. In practice, this condition is never met. Human error, deception, and misinterpretation are always more plausible than a violation of natural law. The more improbable the event, the stronger the evidence required—and testimony alone is never sufficient.
Direct experience always outweighs testimony. If you personally witness an extraordinary event, it rationally carries more weight for you than even the most widely reported historical miracle. This does not mean the event validates any broader religious doctrine. It only means that firsthand evidence is epistemically stronger than hearsay.
A loving and rational God, if he wished miracles to function as evidence, would not require people to depend primarily on the unreliable testimony of others. Belief grounded almost entirely in hearsay is belief grounded in human authority, not in God.
Faith without adequate evidence is not a virtue. Evidence is a good thing, and valuing it is part of moral and intellectual responsibility. Praising belief precisely because it lacks sufficient evidence confuses sincerity with truth and can lead to error and division.
Therefore, asking to witness a miracle before believing it is not unreasonable or demanding special treatment. It is simply applying appropriate standards of evidence to extraordinary claims. Because miracles are among the most extraordinary claims imaginable, they require the strongest possible justification—direct experience. Since such experience is unavailable to nearly everyone, belief in miracles is not rationally obligatory, and disbelief is fully justified.
Further Reading ~
A Christian Faith for Today, W Montgomery Watt, Routledge, London, 2002
Answers to Tough Questions, Josh McDowell and Don Stewart, Scripture Press,
Bucks, 1980
Apparitions, Healings and Weeping Madonnas, Lisa J Schwebel, Paulist Press, New
York, 2004
A Summary of Christian Doctrine, Louis Berkhof, The Banner of Truth Trust,
London, 1971
Catechism of the Catholic Church, Veritas, Dublin, 1995
Catholicism and Fundamentalism, Karl Keating, Ignatius Press, San Francisco,
1988
Enchiridion Symbolorum Et Definitionum, Heinrich Joseph Denzinger, Edited by A
Schonmetzer, Barcelona, 1963
Looking for a Miracle, Joe Nickell, Prometheus Books, New York, 1993
Miracles, Rev Ronald A Knox, Catholic Truth Society, London, 1937
Miracles in Dispute, Ernst and Marie-Luise Keller, SCM Press Ltd, London, 1969
Lourdes, Antonio Bernardo, A. Doucet Publications, Lourdes, 1987
Medjugorje, David Baldwin, Catholic Truth Society, London, 2002
Miraculous Divine Healing, Connie W Adams, Guardian of Truth Publications, KY,
undated
New Catholic Encyclopaedia, The Catholic University of America and the
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc, Washington, District of Columbia, 1967
Raised From the Dead, Father Albert J Hebert SM, TAN, Illinois 1986
Science and the Paranormal, Edited by George O Abell and Barry Singer, Junction
Books, London, 1981
The Demon-Haunted World, Carl Sagan, Headline, London, 1997
The Book of Miracles, Stuart Gordon, Headline, London, 1996
The Case for Faith, Lee Strobel, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2000
The Encyclopaedia of Unbelief Volume 1, Gordon Stein, Editor, Prometheus Books,
New York, 1985
The Hidden Power, Brian Inglis, Jonathan Cape, London, 1986
The Sceptical Occultist, Terry White, Century, London, 1994
The Stigmata and Modern Science, Rev Charles Carty, TAN, Illinois, 1974
Twenty Questions About Medjugorje, Kevin Orlin Johnson, Ph.D. Pangaeus Press,
Dallas, 1999
Why People Believe Weird Things, Michael Shermer, Freeman, New York, 1997
THE WEB
The Problem of Competing Claims by Richard Carrier
www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/indef/4c.html