Definitions
Moral Realism: Some moral statements are objectively true, independent of opinion.
Non-Natural Moral Realism (NNMR): Moral truths exist objectively but are not reducible to natural facts (like pleasure, pain, or evolution).
Intuitionism (related): We can know moral truths through reason, not observation.
Defense of NNMR
Objective Moral Facts Exist: Some acts (e.g., torturing innocents) are clearly wrong regardless of opinion.
Non-Reducibility: Natural facts fail to capture the normative force of moral obligations.
Rational Intuition: We can know basic moral truths through reflection.
Explanatory Power: Treating moral claims as objectively true explains moral reasoning better than error theory or non-cognitivism.
Reduction Fails: No naturalistic definition of “good” fully captures its normative meaning.
Conclusion: Moral truths are objective, non-natural, and knowable via reason.
BUT...
Non-natural moral realism is hard to make sense of because it claims moral truths exist independently of the world but we can still know them. If these moral properties aren’t part of reality we can observe or measure, it’s unclear how we could ever discover or understand them, making the view seem mysterious and possibly incoherent.
Non-natural moral realism may be coherent in theory but still seems morally uninspiring, because it posits moral truths that exist yet are impossible to explain or connect to the world in a clear way. Even if the idea makes sense, if we cannot show how to know or apply these truths, it fails to guide action or motivate moral behavior.
Imagine you’re a doctor in an emergency room and a violent serial killer is brought in, dying. Non‑natural moral realism might claim there is an objective, non‑natural moral truth that “you must always save a life when you can.” But because this moral duty is said to come from a non-natural property with no explanation of why, how, or what exceptions matter, it gives you no practical guidance in this real situation. It doesn’t help you weigh the killer’s future harm, your duty to potential victims, or the safety of others. The rule might be coherent, but it’s so disconnected from real-world reasoning that it becomes morally unhelpful and uninspiring when you actually have to decide what to do.
THE ARGUMENT
Non-Natural Moral Realism is the view that certain actions are objectively wrong even if they do not cause suffering. For example, it holds that intentionally harming a baby for amusement is morally wrong, regardless of whether it causes pain. Like Divine Command Theory, which claims that nothing is immoral unless God commands it, Non-Natural Moral Realism denies that suffering alone determines morality.
Key questions arise:
Is morality real, or merely a matter of opinion?
If it is real, is it real because it promotes well-being?
Or is it real because God commands certain actions to be moral or immoral?
This is the essence of the Euthyphro dilemma.
It seems troubling to claim that harming a baby is wrong only because God forbids it. That is the claim of Divine Command Theory. Non-Natural Moral Realism faces a similar challenge: if moral facts exist independently of natural facts like suffering, they may seem disconnected from human experience.
Consider an extreme example: if someone deliberately harms a baby for fun, Divine Command Theory could imply that it would only be morally right if God commanded it. Here, God’s command creates a brute fact of moral rightness. Without divine authority, the act would be wrong. The suffering caused does not determine the moral status of the act.
Non-Natural Moral Realism makes a related claim: moral facts are not reducible to natural facts such as suffering. They exist independently. This does not mean morality endorses harm; it simply separates moral truth from observable consequences. In both cases, suffering may indicate wrongdoing, but it is not the source of moral truth.
Three central features of Non-Natural Moral Realism:
Non-natural facts: Moral truths are not natural phenomena. If harming a baby is wrong, this fact is not like a leaf being green—it is independent of physical reality.
Objective truth: Moral truths do not depend on human belief or divine authority. What people think does not change the truth of a moral fact.
Enduring optimism: Moral truths are stable and self-supporting; recognizing them allows moral reasoning to proceed even without complete understanding.
Even if Non-Natural Moral Realism raises difficult questions, it avoids the problem of making morality entirely dependent on divine will. It encourages moral reasoning based on objective truths rather than arbitrary commands.
Some critics argue that Non-Natural Moral Realism is beyond scientific verification. This is true: it is a philosophical, not empirical, claim. But the absence of scientific evidence does not imply that moral facts do not exist.
Human well-being and morality:
A plausible account of morality ties it to the prevention of suffering and the promotion of well-being. Avoiding unnecessary harm is primary, while happiness or pleasure is secondary. Moral principles do not require appeal to abstract ideals like justice or love; they can be grounded in the human experience of harm and flourishing.
When philosophers say that an action is objectively wrong if it unjustly harms a sentient being, the term “unjustly” can be clarified as “unnecessarily.” Avoiding unnecessary harm captures the essence of moral concern. Moral reasoning is more about preventing suffering than adhering to abstract notions of justice.
The impersonal nature of moral principles:
Objective moral principles do not require a personal agent or divine source. If a principle dictates that someone’s injury should be treated, the principle’s validity does not depend on whether it comes from a person or God. What matters is the correctness of the principle itself. Similarly, principles that prevent unnecessary harm retain their force whether or not a deity exists.
Practical application:
Even if one lacks full knowledge of objective morality, attempting to act morally is itself morally required. The best approach is to act on the principle of minimizing harm and promoting well-being, while correcting errors as they become apparent. Moral practice and testing are more important than metaphysical certainty. In other words, morality is not only a theoretical concept; it is a lived commitment to maintaining the welfare of oneself and others.
God:
Many people who use God to support morality are effectively endorsing non-natural moral realism, even if they don’t say so explicitly. They treat moral truths as objective and independent of human opinion or culture, but claim that God reveals them. This allows them to avoid linking morality to human experience or cultural context. At the same time, it sidesteps the difficulty of explaining how we can know these moral truths. In other words, appealing to God often functions as a stand-in for the non-natural moral properties that NNMR posits, while masking the same epistemic and explanatory challenges.
Conclusion:
Non-Natural Moral Realism provides a framework for understanding morality as objective, independent of human opinion or divine command, and centered on reducing unnecessary harm. It respects human intuitions about right and wrong while avoiding reliance on unverifiable authority. The guiding principle is simple: minimize suffering and promote well-being. This is the foundation of practical and reasoned moral action.