Introduction:
A soul can be understood as an immaterial force, a non-physical essence that underlies consciousness and life. It is often conceived as a unified, indivisible entity that interacts with the body but is not itself composed of matter. This immaterial nature implies that the soul is defined not by observable properties or physiological functions, but by awareness, experience, and the capacity for thought, perception, and intentionality.
THE ARGUMENT
The Catechism of Christian Doctrine describes the soul as having three powers: memory, understanding, and will. One could question whether these are truly essential to the soul’s existence. If a soul exists, its primary attribute might instead be awareness—the capacity to know that it exists and to perceive other things. A soul could, in principle, be aware even without memory, understanding, or the capacity for intentional action. This perspective avoids equating cognitive ability or memory capacity with the value or completeness of a soul.
If we consider the soul as an indivisible entity, it must be whole rather than a composite of qualities. If a soul were purely love, it would be entirely love; if cruel, entirely cruel. To attribute a mixture of powers or qualities would suggest it can be divided, which conflicts with the notion of a partless, unified essence. Awareness itself could be the fundamental ability of the soul, rather than a separate power among others. Under this view, each distinct moment of awareness could be considered a discrete experience, with the identity of the conscious subject shifting as attention and thought shift.
This perspective resonates in some ways with Sartre’s view of human existence: freedom is prior to essence, and the human person is not a fixed substance but a dynamic process. Experiences, perception, and action constitute a continually becoming self. Seeing is not simply the function of an eye or faculty but the act of perceiving itself. Similarly, freedom is realized through the ongoing process of self-creation rather than as an attribute of a fixed essence.
If one were to interpret life as absolutely valuable while maintaining that the soul exists independently of the body, this could lead to ethical complications. For instance, prioritizing the soul over the body in an absolute sense might imply that bodily harm could be justified to preserve the soul. In practice, such extreme conclusions are generally avoided because the necessity to act in such a manner rarely arises. Still, this highlights the potential consequences of assuming a strict priority of soul over body in ethical reasoning.
Conclusion:
If a soul exists as an immaterial force, its true nature remains fundamentally elusive. While it may be associated with awareness or consciousness, the evidence for its independent existence is limited, and many philosophical and scientific perspectives suggest that what we call the soul could instead emerge from the physical and cognitive processes of the body. Recognizing this uncertainty encourages a careful examination of claims about the soul and highlights the value of grounding our understanding of life and consciousness in observable reality.
If the soul is considered primary and the body secondary, or transcend nature unlike the body, the importance of the body becomes unclear. This ambiguity has historically contributed to the devaluation of the body, sometimes justifying harm, neglect, or even persecution in the name of spiritual ideals. It is debatable if the doctrine is worth it.
On Being, Peter Atkins, Oxford, New York, 2011