Some ethicists propose a theory known as Preference Utilitarianism, which is discussed on page 94 of Peter Singer’s Practical Ethics. This approach represents a shift from traditional utilitarianism, which focuses on maximizing overall happiness or pleasure. Instead, preference utilitarianism suggests that moral decisions should aim to satisfy the preferences of the greatest number of people. In other words, rather than calculating which action produces the most happiness, we should ask: “What do people actually want?” and choose actions that fulfill those desires.
At first glance, preference utilitarianism seems reasonable. After all, happiness often depends on getting what we want, and considering people’s preferences may prevent morally questionable actions that traditional utilitarianism might justify. For example, classical utilitarianism could theoretically endorse actions that produce great pleasure overall but ignore individual desires or social norms. Preference utilitarianism avoids this by prioritizing what people truly prefer.
However, one might question whether this is truly a new form of utilitarianism. One could argue that happiness cannot be fully maximized without considering people’s preferences. People will not be happy if they are forced into situations they dislike, no matter how much pleasure is supposedly available. A simple example illustrates this point: society would not organize a large sex orgy to maximize pleasure, because most people would prefer to have sex with their own partners. In this sense, satisfying preferences often aligns with maximizing happiness, suggesting that preference utilitarianism may be a reformulation rather than a fundamentally new ethical framework.
Despite its intuitive appeal, preference utilitarianism faces several problems. First, people sometimes have irrational or self-destructive preferences, such as the desire to gamble away their savings or to act in ways that harm their long-term well-being. A strict preference-based approach would honor these choices, even if they reduce overall happiness. Second, preferences can conflict, creating dilemmas where it is difficult to satisfy the majority without overriding minority desires. Third, measuring preferences is not always straightforward—people’s wants can be vague, contradictory, or change over time. Unlike traditional utilitarianism, which seeks a quantitative measure of happiness, preference utilitarianism relies on subjective judgments about what individuals truly want.
In conclusion, preference utilitarianism offers an appealing way to respect individual desires while making ethical decisions, emphasizing what people actually prefer rather than abstract calculations of pleasure. However, it raises practical and philosophical challenges, including conflicts between preferences, irrational desires, and the difficulty of measuring them accurately. While it shares much in common with classical utilitarianism—since fulfilling preferences often produces happiness—it is not without its limitations. Ethical theory must therefore weigh the value of respecting preferences against the broader goal of promoting well-being.
APPENDIX
Combining preference utilitarianism with ideal utilitarianism creates a hybrid approach that tries to avoid some of the problems of pure preference satisfaction. Let’s break it down carefully.
1. Recap of the two theories
Preference utilitarianism
Moral rightness = satisfying people’s preferences.
Problem: some preferences might be irrational, harmful, or trivial. E.g., someone might prefer to harm themselves or others, or have short-sighted desires that reduce overall well-being.
Ideal utilitarianism
Moral rightness = promoting intrinsically valuable things (not just pleasure or preference).
Examples of intrinsic goods might include knowledge, beauty, friendship, or well-being.
It does not automatically count all desires/preferences—only those that are genuinely “good” or rational in some sense.
2. Combining the two
When you combine them:
You keep the preference-focused framework: actions are judged by whether they satisfy preferences.
But you filter the preferences through a criterion of “goodness” or rationality. Only preferences that are considered genuinely good (aligned with knowledge, well-being, or some other intrinsic value) count.
So, self-destructive, trivial, or malicious preferences would not be treated as morally relevant.
Example:
A person prefers to gamble away their life savings.
Pure preference utilitarianism: you should respect this preference.
Ideal preference utilitarianism: this preference is “bad” because it harms well-being; it doesn’t count in the moral calculus.
A person prefers to spend time with family:
This preference is “good” because it aligns with well-being and meaningful relationships, so it counts in the calculation.
3. Advantages of this hybrid
Avoids endorsing irrational or harmful preferences.
Still respects individual choice and subjective values.
Can accommodate complex moral intuitions (e.g., not all desires are morally equal).
4. Problems and challenges
Who decides which preferences are “good”? This introduces subjectivity or paternalism.
Potential conflict with autonomy: some people might reasonably prefer something that others judge as “bad.”
Complexity: it can be difficult to determine which preferences are intrinsically valuable, making moral calculations harder than classical or pure preference utilitarianism.
Summary: Combining preference utilitarianism with ideal utilitarianism creates a “filtered” preference approach: you aim to satisfy preferences, but only those that are morally or rationally good. This addresses problems with harmful or irrational desires but introduces new questions about judgment, subjectivity, and autonomy. It’s a middle ground between respecting people’s choices and promoting genuine value. It offers a reasonable compromise: it tries to honor what people want while avoiding clearly harmful or irrational outcomes. It may never be perfect, but it is a pragmatic and ethically defensible option.