Is what we choose really a choice as in us creating it out of nothing. Or are forces at work that cause you to do what you do?
Free will sums up the first bit.
Determinism is the word for the second.
Try and avoid confusion for traditionally choice means something you have control over - while in determinism the word signifies that you have a reaction that you feel free about.
There is a false equivalence error there. Some play on the confusion to argue, "You can be a determinist and if you are not forced by outside entities then your action is yours and you are responsible for it so free will and determinism are compatible." This notion is called soft determinism.
Thus, soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, is the view that determinism and free will can coexist and even need each other. It argues that although our choices are shaped by internal and external factors—our upbringing, biology, experiences—we are still free if our actions arise from internal motives and not external coercion. This essay critically evaluates that position.
What Is at Stake?
At the heart of this issue is the question:
Are our choices truly free—created by us independently of all prior causes—or are they determined by forces beyond our control?
If free will means we are the original sources of our actions, then determinism seems to undermine that. But if free will simply means acting in accordance with our own desires—regardless of where those desires come from—then soft determinism becomes a possibility.
The Meaning of Choice
A common source of confusion in this debate lies in the ambiguity of the term “choice.”
In everyday use, choice suggests real alternatives and personal control. But in a deterministic framework, choice is redefined as selecting the outcome that aligns with one's strongest desire or motive—even if that desire is itself determined by prior causes.
Some soft determinists use this ambiguity to claim:
“As long as you are not being forced by someone else, your actions are yours, and you are responsible for them—even if determinism is true.”
This view simplifies a deep problem and sidesteps the issue of where our motives and desires actually come from.
Responsibility Under Soft Determinism
Soft determinism holds that people are responsible if their actions flow from internal states like desires or beliefs, even if those states are determined.
However, this raises serious concerns. If freedom is defined as merely doing what you most want, regardless of how those wants arose, then even compulsive or self-destructive behavior might be considered “free.” This view detaches freedom from the deeper question of whether we could have acted otherwise under the same conditions.
Self-Programming and the Illusion of Freedom
Some soft determinists argue that we “program” ourselves over time. While it’s true that our habits and patterns of thought can shape future decisions, the fact remains:
If our self-programming is itself the product of prior programming, are we truly free?
This leads to a potential infinite regress: if the self that programs was itself programmed, then we are never truly the origin of our actions. Freedom, in this view, becomes illusory.
Can Determinism and Freedom Really Coexist?
One popular soft determinist claim is:
“Our choices are both determined and free.”
This is conceptually problematic. If an action is determined by prior causes, then in what meaningful sense could it have been otherwise?
True free will, as traditionally understood, requires the power of contrary choice—the real ability to have done otherwise under the same conditions. If that ability is missing, so too is meaningful freedom.
Common Objections Considered
Objection: “We can change our behavior by anticipating future consequences, like throwing out chocolate cake to stick to a diet.”
Response: While this seems to show self-control, it does not prove freedom in the libertarian sense. Even the decision to throw out the cake may be a result of prior conditioning or psychological patterns.
Objection: “We only choose what we perceive as good, so we are determined yet free.”
Response: This argument assumes what it needs to prove—that we are free. If we are compelled by our nature to perceive and choose what seems good to us, then we are still acting under compulsion, even if the compulsion feels internal.
Objection: “We are free at times and determined at others (e.g., losing one's temper).”
Response: This does not support soft determinism, but rather suggests that determinism and free will are incompatible and occur at different times. That undermines the claim that they are always compatible.
The Real Issue with Soft Determinism
Soft determinism depends on redefining freedom as non-coercion rather than genuine self-originated choice. But this raises the question:
If we can only ever do what our nature and circumstances determine us to do, how can we be truly responsible?
Even if we feel free, feelings alone are not enough to establish metaphysical freedom. People may feel in control and yet be deeply shaped by
unseen forces.
The Future-Focus Argument and Animals
Some soft determinists argue that humans, unlike animals, can shape their futures and are thus responsible. But animals can also change behavior based on consequences. A cat avoids a dog after being chased. If anticipating the future makes an action “free,” then this would suggest animals are moral agents too—an implication few compatibilists would accept.
This shows that future-orientation alone is not a sufficient condition for moral responsibility or genuine freedom.
The Burden of Proof
Soft determinism may be internally coherent, but coherence is not the same as truth. It relies heavily on redefining terms and making assumptions without conclusive evidence. If there is no way to test whether we are truly free or merely feel free, the theory risks becoming unfalsifiable—and thus philosophically weak.
They use a process of elimination. They will argue that the usual free will teaching, libertarian free will, is incoherent so free will and determinism must fit. This is mistaken for who says soft determinism makes more sense or any sense? If you have no coffee in the house that does not imply you must have tea in it.
Conclusion
Soft determinism tries to reconcile freedom with determinism by redefining what it means to be free. However, if freedom means the real possibility of doing otherwise under the same conditions, soft determinism does not deliver.
At best, it offers a psychological or legal model of responsibility—not a metaphysical one. And if our choices are ultimately the result of prior causes we did not choose, then true moral responsibility remains a problem.
While soft determinism may offer a comforting middle ground, it fails to address the deeper issues raised by determinism. For those who believe in genuine freedom—the ability to choose otherwise—soft determinism is not an adequate solution.
APPENDIX:
If determinism and free will fit, then why not affirm that heroin addicts are acting freely after all as long as they feel they want the drugs?
The hard determinist regards free will as impossible - is he hiding behind the soft determinist label? Is he subtly undermining free will?
If determinism and free will fitting would be a paradox, then where is the proof for both of them and for the fit? The rule is that a paradox is only to be taken seriously if both the things it says that seem to contradict each other are verified. Otherwise, the door is opened to confusing contradictions and paradoxes.
APPENDIX:
Dead people cannot be held responsible for their past actions because they no longer have the capacity to respond or change. While this is widely accepted, it is important to recognize that although we cannot undo what we have done, as living beings we still have the ability to influence our future choices and behaviors. Unlike the dead, we retain the capacity to learn from our past and make different decisions moving forward.
But what if we had a hypothetical choice?
Do we forget - as in literal erasure - taking responsibility for the past or do we look to the future?
The latter would count the most.
Yet free will would seem to hold that the future has not happened yet and so the past should matter most.
Do not be fooled by those who influence you to stress free will so much on the grounds of moral responsibility. It is an overrated notion.
APPENDIX:
Suppose animals had a version of free will - maybe different from ours but no less valid.
But what if we had a hypothetical choice?
Do we forget - as in literal erasure - that we with them are free agents? Or do we forget that they have it and remember that we do?
If free will is valuable, it should be the first.
That is good test of values. We should value free will because it is free will and not because of how useful or otherwise it is.
This suggests free will should be valued intrinsically - for itself. Not instrumentally - for usefulness. Who thinks we really care except for how useful we think it is?
The claim that we must value human persons for being free agents made in the image of God does not reflect our obsession with how free will seems to be instrumentally useful.